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Abstract. This paper aims to enhance the security and resilience of Critical 
Information Infrastructures (CIIs) by providing a dynamic collaborative, 
warning and response system (CyberSANE system) supporting and guiding 
security officers and operators (e.g. Incident Response professionals) to 
recognize, identify, dynamically analyse, forecast, treat and respond to their 
threats and risks and handle their daily cyber incidents. The proposed solution 
provides a first of a kind approach for handling cyber security incidents in the 
digital environments with highly interconnected, complex and diverse nature. 
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1   Introduction 
In the digital era, Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are operating under the premise of 
robust and reliable ICT components, complex ICT infrastructures and emerging 
technologies (e.g. IoT, Cloud Computing) and are transforming into Critical 
Information Infrastructures (CIIs) that can offer a high degree of flexibility and 
efficiency in the communication and coordination of advanced services. The increased 
usage of information technology in modern CIIs means that they are becoming more 
vulnerable to the activities of hackers and other perpetrators of cyber-related crime.  
Over the last few years, it is a common phenomenon to see daily headlines 
describing major cyber-attacks or some new strain of malware or insidious social 
engineering technique being used to attack ICT infrastructures. In particular, CIIs 
have become lately targets for cyberattacks attracting the attention of security 
researchers, cyber-criminals, hacktivists (e.g. Anonymous, LulzSec) and other such 
role-players (e.g. cyber-spies). These cyber actors have significantly evolved their 
tactics, techniques and procedures to include next-generation malware toolkits 
available in various locations on the internet (e.g. deep web, dark web) and new data 
exfiltration methods that give them an asymmetric quantum leap in capability. In the 
past years, there have been a number of cybersecurity meltdowns and high-profile 
breaches affecting critical infrastructures, such as the recent ransomware attacks, 
WannaCry and WanaCrypt0r 2.0, which affected more than 230,000 computers in 
over 150 countries, In most cases, the adversaries targeted the organizations’ 
interconnected infrastructures as a means of spreading their harmful malware to a 
broaderaudience. Obviously, the impact of a compromised CII can extend far beyond 
the corporate boundaries, putting not just individual organizations but also their 
dependent entities at risk. 
In 2016, the Commission introduced the E.U. Directive NIS 2016 that enforces all 
CIIs to report to an appropriate Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) 
any incident having a substantial impact on the provision of their services. 
Unfortunately, these efforts mostly focused on providing just the legal basis and 
creating an assurance framework for boosting the cyber security culture across sectors 
which are vital for the EU economy and society and moreover rely heavily on ICTs. 
Nevertheless, there has been a lack of innovation to capture and correlate events and 
information associated with cyber-attacks in CIIs as well as lack of appropriate 
approaches that support and facilitate effective cooperation among the CIIs entities in 
terms of exchanging specific cybersecurity risk and threats information. 
The paper proposes a state of the art solution, the CyberSANE system, which aims 
to improve the detection and analysis of cyber-attacks and threats on CIIs and 
increases the knowledge of the current cyber threat landscape. In particular, the 
CyberSANE system helps the organizations to raise their preparedness, improve their 
cooperation with each other, and adopt appropriate steps to manage security risks, 
report and handle security incidents. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 and 3 present the related work and the main aspects of the proposed incident 
handling approach respectively. Section 4 describes the CyberSANE system and its 
key components. Section 5 illustrates the components data flows and the overall 
system operation; and finally Section 6 draws the conclusions. 
2   Current Efforts of Incident Handling in Critical Information 
Infrastructures 
The main goal of the security incident handling and response process is to define the 
main aspects and principles for coordinating the effort that should be applied in 
managing a security breach/incident/event [1,2]. In principle, choosing the right 
approach for incident handling proves to be complicated. In recent years, a number of 
security incident response approaches and frameworks [3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14] 
have been introduced by the research and industrial communities as well various 
standardization bodies. Although, many of these approaches provide specific technical 
guidelines, aiming to enhance the security incident response capabilities of the 
organizations, they present significant limitations. In particular, Grimes (2007) argues 
that most of the existing incident response approaches follow a linear process that is 
outdated and does not support the highly efficient capability that is required to handle 
and manage today’s incidents. Therefore, a progression flaw exists in these processes, 
since if one phase in the linear process is not completed, the entire process cycle may 
stop midstream. [15] notes that current incident response processes are too focused on 
the containment, eradication, and recovery-related activities and usually ignore, skip 
or do not emphasize on other important steps of incident management, such as 
investigations actions. [16] proposal gives emphasis on proactive preparation and 
reactive learning to encourage security incident learning. [17,18,19] argue that the 
existing incident handling approaches do not provide adequate guidance on how to 
conduct effective forensic investigations. Hence, current methods’ limitation to assist 
and guide the investigators in forensic evidence analysis, undermines the value of the 
evidence and fails to promote incident resolution.  
In addition, the available security information and event management solutions lack 
significant reactive and post-incident capabilities for managing incidents and events in 
the scope of the ICT-based CIIs providing inadequate technical guidance to the 
incident response professionals on how to detect, investigate and reproduce attacks. 
As such, and despite the socioeconomic importance of tools and techniques for 
handling incidents there is still no easy, structured, standardized and trusted way to 
manage and forecast interrelated, cybersecurity incidents in a way that takes into 
account the heterogeneity and complexity of the CIIs and the increasingly 
sophisticated types of attacks. Therefore, there is a pressing need for devising novel 
systems for efficient CIIs incident handling and support thorough and common 
understanding of cyber-attack situations in a timely manner. 
In a nutshell, the main limitations [20,21,22] of the existing approaches are the 
following: (i) the traditional linear incident response models are too slow, ineffective 
and do not support the highly efficient capability that is required to handle and 
manage today’s incidents; (ii) focus mostly on the proactive element (i.e. provide 
assistance and information to help prepare, protect, and secure) of the incident 
management; (iii)  current approaches do not provide enough insight into the 
underlying causes of the incident; (iv) poor provisions for incident planning; (v) 
undermine the value of forensic evidence possibly required for subsequent legal 
action; (vi) do not take into account the risk-related results produced by existing risk 
assessment methodologies. 
3   CyberSANE Incident Handling Approach 
The proposed incident handling approach aims to address the aforementioned 
limitations of these existing methodologies and tools, providing a step-by-step 
guidance to manage incidents and breaches on CIIs occurred due to cyber attacks. On 
this account, CyberSANE pursues to combine active approaches that are used to 
detect and analyse anomaly activities and attacks in real-time with reactive approaches 
that deals with the analysis of the underlying infrastructure to assess an incident in 
order to provide a more holistic and integrated approach to incident handling. In this 
vein, CyberSANE aims to enhance the incident detection capabilities of the existing 
methods described in the previous section with a more efficient, elastic and scalable 
reasoning approach. The main characteristics of the proposed approach are the 
following: (i) learning from unstructured data without the need to understand the 
content; (ii) identification of unusual activities that match the structural patterns of 
possible intrusions (instead of predefined rules); and (iii) automatic identification and 
adaption to a change of the underlying infrastructure.  
CyberSANE treats the handling of a cyber incident as a dynamic experimental 
environment that can be optimized involving all relevant CIIs’ operators and security 
experts. CyberSANE’s approach is based on simulations to facilitate the evaluation 
and analysis of an identified incident and support the investigation decision making 
process in a rigorous manner. The pursuit of CyberSANE is to support incident 
handling process with advanced correlation capabilities in terms of accuracy and 
efficiency strengthening the rational analysis. In this context, CyberSANE relies on 
pioneering mathematical models (e.g. machine learning, deep learning and Global 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques) for analysing, compiling, combining and 
correlating all incident-related information and data from different levels and contexts 
(e.g. taking into consideration information, data and opinions collected and analysed 
from existing risk assessment frameworks (including the CYSM, MEDUSA, 
MITIGATE and SAURON approaches [23,24,25], knowledge and information 
acquired from previous incident investigations as well as evidential data extracted 
from the compromised cyber systems). Thus, these techniques will be able to identify, 
extract and analyse the most relevant parts of the information related to the initial 
incident in order to find the relationships between the compromised devices/systems 
and these evidences.  
Moreover, efficient simulation experiments for generating multi-order evidence 
dependencies have been used to generate and construct secure, reliable and valid 
chains of evidence anticipating how the attack is progressing. Additionally, taking into 
account the effects of a security incident, real-time insights, alerts and warnings will 
be produced to increase situation awareness, inform the CIIs’ stakeholders about the 
effects of the events and guide them how to react. 
The main contribution of the current approach that differentiates it from the 
aforementioned related incident handling proposals is that it combines existing 
machine learning techniques, such as clustering and hidden Markov models, with deep 
learning and Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) to develop an innovative way that 
optimizes the automatic analysis of huge amounts of events, information and evidence. 
To identify malicious actions in the cyber assets, such as abnormal behaviours, it 
combines both structured data (e.g. logs and network traffic) and unstructured data 
(e.g. data coming from social networks and dark web) in a privacy-aware manner. 
Furthermore, it adopts deep semantic analysis techniques together with Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) methods (e.g. Named Entity Recognition and Word 
Sense Disambiguation) to extract important information from multilingual security-
related contexts, facilitating  multilingual data generation and exploitation within the 
networked ecosystem. 
4   CyberSANE Incident Handling system 
CyberSANE is an advanced, configurable and adaptable, Security and Privacy 
Incident Handling system (CyberSANE system), towards effective security incident 
detection and handling. The main goal of the proposed system is to improve, intensify 
and coordinate the overall security efforts for the effective and efficient identification; 
investigation, mitigation and reporting of realistic multi-dimensional attacks within the 
interconnected web of cyber assets in the CIIs and security events. The proposed 
approach takes into consideration and addresses both technical and cognitive 
challenges.  
 
Fig. 1. CyberSANE Incident Handling system 
From technical perspective, the system aims at collecting, compiling, processing and 
fusing all individual incident-related information ensuring their integrity and validity 
following the generic phases of ISO/IEC 27035:2016. In contrast, from cognitive 
point of view, the decision makers should be able to understand the technical aspects 
of an attack and draw conclusions on how to respond. In order to realize this vision, 
the CyberSANE system will be composed of five main components: 
 The Live Security Monitoring and Analysis (LiveNet) component which is 
able to monitor, analyze, and visualize organizations’ internal live network 
traffic in real time. This environment aggregates and visualizes traffic 
flowing through live networks as well as alerts given out by security 
appliances installed at critical points in the network with an overemphasis on 
threat prevention solutions. 
 The Deep and Dark Web mining and intelligence (DarkNet) component 
which monitors the Dark and Deep Web in order to grasp and analyse the big 
picture of global malware/ cybersecurity activities. 
 The Data Fusion, Risk Evaluation and Event Management (HybridNet) 
component that receives security related information on potential cyber 
threats from both LiveNet and Darknet respectively in order to  analyze and 
evaluate the security situation inside an organization. 
 The Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination (ShareNet) 
component disseminates and shares information of useful incident-related 
information with relevant parties (e.g. industry cooperation groups, Computer 
Security Incident Response Teams - CSIRTs) about the effects and danger of 
incidents characterized diffusing threats. 
 The Privacy & Data Protection (PrivacyNet) Orchestrator which provides a 
set of privacy (anonymization, pseudonymization, obfuscation), data 
protection orchestration and consistency capabilities. 
It should be noted that the proposed solution and the incorporating techniques is 
able to operate in heterogeneous, large-scale, cross-border CIIs that are characterized 
by the following features: (i) complex, highly distributed, and large-scale cyber 
systems (including IoT and cyber-physical) with respect to the number of entities 
involved; (ii) heterogeneity of the underlying networks interconnecting the physical-
cyber systems; and (iii) different levels of exposure to attacks. The following Sections 
provide a detailed description of the each component. 
 
4.1   Live Security Monitoring and Analysis (LiveNet) component 
The LiveNet is an advanced and scalable Live Security Monitoring and Analysis 
component capable of preventing and detecting threats and, in case of a declared 
attack, capable of mitigating the effects of an infection/intrusion. The main objective 
of this component is to implement the Identification, Extraction, Transformation, and 
Load process for collecting and preparing all the relevant information, serving as the 
interface between the underlying CIIs and the CyberSANE system. It includes proper 
cyber security monitoring sensors with network-based Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), innovative Anomaly detection modules and endpoint protection solutions for 
accessing and extracting information, on a real-time basis, in order to detect complex 
and large-scale attacks (e.g. Advanced Persistent Threats). The incident-related 
information that reside in different and heterogeneous cyber systems may include 
various types of data, such as: active (unpatched) vulnerabilities in the technological 
infrastructure; misuse detection in the network or in the systems, including both host-
based and network-based IDS deployment and integration; anomaly detection in the 
network or in the systems; system availability signals; network usage and bandwidth 
monitoring; industry proprietary protocol anomalies; SCADA vulnerabilities, etc. 
LiveNet incorporates appropriate data management and reasoning capabilities for: 
near real-time identification of anomalies, threats, risks and faults and the appropriate 
reactions; (ii) proactive reaction to threats and attacks; and (iii) dynamic decision 
making in micro, macro and global level according to the end user's needs and the 
identified incidents/threats. These capabilities are empowered with more innovative 
algorithms based on techniques such as machine learning, deep learning and AI that 
identify previously unknown attacks. This component provides an abstraction of the 
collected information to the Data Fusion, Risk Evaluation and Event Management 
(HybridNet) component of the CyberSANE system. Moreover, all incidents-related 
information captured from LiveNet will be parsed, filtered, harmonized and enriched 
to ensure that only the data necessary for the multivariate and multidimensional 
analysis are available to the other components (e.g. HybridNet). Thus, LiveNet 
contributes as follows: (i) preventing a flood of irrelevant or repeated information 
from cluttering the HybridNet processing component; and (ii) consolidating the 
different data contents and formats towards a uniform perspective in order to provide 
the upper components a unified and convenient way to handle the information. 
 
4.2   Deep and Dark Web mining and intelligence (DarkNet) component 
The Deep and Dark Web mining and intelligence (DarkNet) component provides the 
appropriate Social Information Mining capabilities that will allow the exploitation and 
analysis of security, risks and threats related information embedded in user-generated 
content (UGC). This is achieved via the analysis of both the textual and meta-data 
content available from such streams. Textual information is processed to extract data 
from otherwise disparate and distributed sources that may offer unique insights on 
possible cyber threats. Examples include the identification of situations that can 
become a threat for the CIIs with significant legal, regulatory and technical 
considerations. Such situations are: organization of hacktivist activities in 
underground forums or IRC channels; external situations that can become a potential 
threat to the CIIs (e.g. relevant geopolitical changes); disclosure of zero day 
vulnerabilities; sockpuppets impersonating real profiles in social networks etc. Entities 
(e.g., events, places) and security-realated information will be uniquely extracted from 
textual content using advanced Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques, such 
as sentiment analysis. 
 
4.3 Data Fusion, Risk Evaluation and Event Management (HybridNet) 
component 
The Data Fusion, Risk Evaluation and Event Management (HybridNet) component 
provides the intelligence needed to perform effective and efficient analysis of a 
security event based on: (i) information derived and acquired by the LiveNet and 
DarkNet components; and (ii) information and data produced and extracted from this 
component. In particular, HybridNet component retrieves incidents-related data via 
the LiveNet component from the underlying CIIs and data from unstructured and 
structured sources (e.g. from Deep and Dark Web) consolidated in a unified 
longitudinal view which are linked, analyzed and correlated ,in order to achieve 
semantic meaning and provide a more comprehensive and detailed view of the 
incident. In CyberSANE, a formal and uniform representation of digital evidence 
along with their relationships has been used to encapsulate all concepts of the forensic 
field and provide a common understanding of the structure of all information linking 
to evidence among the CIIs’ operators and the forensics investigators. The main goal 
of the analysis process is to continuously carry out the assessment (e.g. identification 
of on-going attacks and related information, such as what is the stage of the attack and 
where is the attacker) and prediction (i.e. identification of possible scenarios of future 
attacks through forecasting models). HybridNet incorporates fusion models based on 
existing mathematical models (e.g. data mining, AI, deep learning, machine learning 
and visualization techniques). These models will support and provide reasoning 
capabilities for the near real-time identification of anomalies, threats and attacks, 
assessing any possible malicious actions in the cyber assets such as abnormal 
behaviors or malicious connections to identify unusual activities that match the 
structural patterns of possible intrusions. Once an attack is detected or predicted a 
simulation will be performed to form the full representation of the attack. In particular, 
a Security Incident/Attack Simulation Environment undertakes to generate and 
construct all secure, reliable and valid chains of evidence allowing: i) the 
identification of the attacker’s behavior so far; ii) the identification of the attacker’s 
goals and strategies and prediction of their next actions; and (iii) the accurate 
assessment of the impact of an incident on the CII and the damage caused so far. 
The Security Incident/Attack Simulation Environment of the CyberSANE system 
comprises a set of novel mathematical instruments, including mathematical models for 
simulating, analyzing, optimizing, validating, monitoring simulation data and 
optimizing security incident handling process. Specifically, these instruments include: 
(i) a buddle of novel process/attack analysis and simulation techniques for designing, 
executing, analyzing and optimizing threat and attack simulation experiments that will 
produce appropriate evidence and information that facilitate the identification, 
assessment and mitigation of the CII-related risks; (ii) graph theory to implement 
attack graph generation, to perform security incident analysis and to strengthen the 
prognosis of future malefactor steps; (iii) pioneering mathematical techniques for 
analyzing, compiling and combining information and evidences about security 
incidents and attacks/threats patterns and paths in order to find relationships between 
the recovered forensic artefacts and piecing the evidential data together to develop a 
set of useful chain of evidence (linked evidence) associated with a specific incident; 
(iv) innovative simulation techniques which will optimize the automatic analysis of 
diverse data; (v) innovative techniques in order to link optimization and simulation. In 
this context, this simulation environment is fed with information about an incident and 
proceeds to calculate and generate a number of possible attack graphs (routes of 
possible attacks) and graphs of linked evidence (chains of evidence) and also compute 
probabilities for a sequence of events on top of these graphs. The resulting 
probabilistic estimate for the compromised CIIs’ assets will be used to identify, model 
and represent the course of an attack as it propagates across the CIIs. It should be 
noted the HybridNet component continuously updates the simulation engine with 
information collected and piece of information, thereby enabling both understanding 
which assets might have been compromised, as well as gain more accurate estimates 
on the likelihood that other assets might be compromised in the future. 
 
4.4 Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination (ShareNet) 
component 
The ShareNet component provides the necessary threat intelligence and information 
sharing capabilities within the CIIs and with relevant parties (e.g. industry cooperation 
groups, CSIRTs). It is responsible for the instantiation of the adopted intelligence 
model; in particular, ShareNet undertakes the identification and dissemination of, the 
right and sanitized information that have to be shared in a usable format and in a 
timely manner. This environment produces and circulates notifications containing 
critical information, enhancing the perception of the current situation and improving 
the projection into the future. It should be noted that all potential evidence from the 
systems that are suspected to be part of the infrastructure being investigated are 
forensically captured, stored and exchanged in a way that their integrity is maintained 
using the security and data protection methods of the PrivacyNet Orchestrator. 
To this end, ShareNet follows a trusted and distributed intelligence and incident 
sharing approach to facilitate and promote the collaboration and secure and privacy-
aware information sharing of the CIIs’ operators with relevant parties (e.g. industry 
cooperation groups, CSIRTs), in order to exchange risk incident-related information, 
through specific standards and/or formats (STIX), improving overall cyber risk 
understanding and reduction. Privacy preserving is another important issue considered 
at every phase of sharing, applying methods such as anonymization or pseudo 
anonymization and encryption techniques incorporated in and made available from 
PrivacyNet Orchestrator. This brings forward a mixture of several cryptographic 
techniques that holds certain security guarantees. 
 
4.5 Privacy & Data Protection (PrivacyNet) Orchestrator  
Through the specific “Privacy & Data Protection Orchestrator” (PrivacyNet), it is 
possible to coordinate the abovementioned components of the CyberSANE system in 
order to ensure desired-levels of data protection for sensitive incident-related 
information, enabling the possibility to apply such protection in all phases of cyber 
security incident handling flow. The main purpose the PrivacyNet is to manage and 
orchestrate the application of the innovative privacy mechanisms and maximize 
achievable levels of confidentiality and data protection towards compliance with the 
highly-demanding provisions in the GDPR in the context of protecting sensitive 
incident-related information within and outside CIIs. To this end, PrivacyNet sets up 
the security and data “protection configurations” allowing security experts and 
members of the incident response team to specify all the protection steps that have to 
be performed and the required conditions to execute them, which can be referred to 
GDPR-based rules (and to other guidance for its application by the European Data 
Protection Board, formerly Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party).  
In addition, the orchestration approach of the CyberSANE allows applying the 
most appropriate security and data protection methods depending on the user’s 
privacy requirements, which cover a wide range of techniques including 
anonymization, location privacy, obfuscation, pseudonymization, searchable 
encryption, multi-party computation and verifiable computation, in order to meet the 
highly demanding regulatory compliance obligations, for example in relation to 
accountability towards data protection supervisory authorities, for adequate 
management of informed consent etc. For this reason, novel techniques and processes 
for enhancing the secure distribution and storage of all forensic artifacts in order to 
protect them from unauthorized deletion, tampering revision and sharing (e.g. 
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) and block-chain technologies) have be combined. 
5   CyberSANE Components Data Flow and System Operation 
The abovementioned CyberSANE components communicate to carry out 13 
operational data flows as illustrated in Figure 2 and outlines below. Through, those 
data flows and the overall operation, the CyberSANE system assists all the phases of 
security assessment and reduction of cyber risks on relevant operational scenarios. 
 
Fig. 2. CyberSANE System’s & Components’ Operation 
The operational data flows supported by the CyberSANE system are the following: (1) 
Detected cyber attack visualized in the LiveNet Component; (2) Determine whether 
their organization has fallen victim to a cyber-attack; (3) Discovery, extraction and 
collection of raw data from various sources (e.g. servers, logs) and in different format 
(4) Extraction, harmonization and processing data from distributed sources (Dark 
Web, Social Media) that offer unique insights on the cyber threats and provide 
information about latest mechanisms of cyber-attacks; (5) Collected data is 
normalized, cleansed to remove redundant information and transformed into a 
common representation format; (6) All relevant information extracted are analyzed 
and correlated to provide a more comprehensive and detailed view of the incident; (7) 
Dependency evidence chains are generated; (8) Identification of on-going attacks 
(Identification of the attacker’s behavior, prediction of next actions); (9) Evaluate the 
risks; Assess the impact and the assessment and cascading effects; and Formulate 
mitigation plan; (10) Prediction of possible scenarios of future attacks; (11) 
Visualization of incident related information enabling deep understanding of the 
situation and decision making (Notifications); (12) Secure and privacy aware 
managing and storing of incident-related information; and (13) Information sharing 
and dissemination of useful incident-related information. 
6   Conclusions  
The paper aims to leverage collected security information to find new ways of 
protection for technology assets, enabling the entity at risk to evaluate the risk and 
invest to limit that risk in an optimal way. Providing a way to securely collect both 
structured data (e.g. logs and network traffic) and unstructured data (e.g. data coming 
from social networks and dark web) and making them available for analysis fosters 
new innovations that will only unravel after having access to such data, harnessing its 
full potential. CyberSANE’s has a twofold aim; to minimize the exposure to security 
risks/threats and help CIIs’ operators to respond successfully to relevant incidents.  
The ground-breaking nature of the proposed incident handling approach is based 
on: i) the identification of attacks and incidents using innovative approaches and 
algorithms of unobserved components techniques and linear state-space models 
producing meaningful information from cyber systems, ii) the combination of active 
incident handling approaches with reactive approaches producing real-time insights, 
alerts and warnings about cyber events, iii) innovative normalization process that 
unifies all relevant incident-related information gathered from heterogeneous CIIs, iv) 
novel attacks’ scenarios and evidence representation with simulation techniques and 
visualization tools that increase the efficiency of investigation results, v) hybridization 
forms of mathematical models and combinations of data mining, Global artificial 
intelligence, machine learning that optimize evidential data from different sources. 
The proposed CyberSANE System meets its objectives embedding core security 
features allowing faster and better operation of advanced cyber security 
functionalities. These aspects comprise an innovative, knowledge based, collaborative 
security and response dynamic system which increase the agility of the investigators 
and encourage continuous learning throughout the incident life cycle. 
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